INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State* SANITIZED

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
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By cb, NARA, Date 9-20-95

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

L I M D I S

1. DEFENSE MINISTER CHIANG AND GEN WHEELER CONDUCTED DISCUSSIONS FOR APPROX ONE HOUR AND 15 MINS THE AFTERNOON OF 29 DEC 1965. PRESENT AT THESE DISCUSSIONS WERE: GEN WHEELER, ADM GENTNER, MGEN D.B. JOHNSON AND CAPT R. G. TOWER ON THE US SIDE. THE CHINESE PRESENT WERE THE MINISTER OF NATL DEFENSE; VICE MINISTER

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OF DEFENSE, MA CHI-CHUANG; CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF, NI YEU-SI; DEPUTY CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF, YU PAK-CHUNG; LIAISON CHIEF, RADM CHIH MENG-BING; AND INTERPRETER. MINISTER CHIANG EXCHANGED A FEW PLEASANTRIES WITH GEN WHEELER THEN OPENED THE DISCUSSIONS BY ASKING THE GENERAL IF HE CARED TO COMMENT UPON THE PROGRESS OF THE WAR IN SOUTH VIET-NAM. THE FOLLOWING ARE THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE DISCUSSIONS AS DEVELOPED BY MINISTER CHIANG. THE ENTIRE DISCUSSION TOOK PLACE IN AN AIR OF CORDIALITY, OBJECTIVITY AND RESTRAINT.

2. MINISTER CHIANG FIRST OFFERED INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION TO THE EFFECT THAT THE CHINESE COMMUNIST 38TH DIVISION, HEADQUARTERED AT MENG TZE, HAVE MOVED FOUR REGIMENTS OF INFANTRY INTO NORTH VIETNAM AND THAT THIS INFORMATION HAD BEEN RELIABLY CONFIRMED BY THREE GRC SOURCES. THE MINISTER STATED HE BELIEVED THAT THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF THESE INFANTRY REGIMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM WAS TO MAINTAIN PRESSURE UPON HO CHI MINH. HE BELIEVED HO MAY BE WAVERING DUE TO THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM BY US

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FORCES. HE ALSO INDICATED THAT THESE FOUR INFANTRY REGIMENTS WOULD SERVE TO RELIEVE NORTH VIETNAM UNITS FOR MORE ACTIVE DUTIES.

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THE MINISTER WENT ON TO STATE THAT THE CHICOMS ARE ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN PREPARATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE WAR IN VIETNAM AND HE CITED AS EXAMPLES THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A VIETNAMESE LANGUAGE SCHOOL AT CANTON, THE MOVEMENT OF TROOPS INTO SOUTH CHINA, AND AN ORGANIZATION ENTITLED "THE CHINESE PEOPLES ANTI-US AND VIETNAM VOLUNTEERS" WHICH IS FORMING IN KIANGSI PROVINCE.

3. MINISTER CHINAG EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER US STRATEGY IN SOUTH VIET-NAM AND ASKED GEN WHEELER DIRECTLY WHAT US STRATEGY WAS. THE MINISTER WENT ON TO STATE THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR THE CHINESE TO UNDERSTAND THE LESSONS OF WAR WHICH ARE NOW BEING PRACTICED IN VIETNAM AND TO THIS EFFECT HE IS DIRECTING A GROUP OF OFFICERS TO PROCEED TO SOUTH VIET-NAM. THERE HE INTENDS THEY WILL STUDY THE WEAPONS AND TACTICS OF THE VIET CONG IN ORDER TO APPLY THESE LESSONS TO HIS OWN FORCES IN THEIR WAR AGAINST THE CHICOMS.

4. TURNING FROM THE WAR IN VIETNAM THE MINISTER POINTED OUT THAT WHILE THIS PARTICULAR CORNER OF WORLD WAS RELATIVELY QUIET THE FUTURE WAS VERY VERY DIFFICULT TO PREDICT. CHICOM POLICY IS ONE OF OPEN AGGRESSIVENESS AGAINST TAIWAN AND THE BASIC ATTITUDE OF THE GRC IN RETURN IS FIRST TO SUPPORT THE US IN ITS ACTIONS, AND SECOND TO NEVER OVERLOOK ITS OWN

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DEFENSE. THE MINISTER HOPED THE US WOULD HELP IN THIS LATTER TASK.

5. PROCEEDING FROM THIS POINT MINISTER CHIANG INDICATED THAT THE QUALITY OF CHICOM FORCES CONTINUED TO IMPROVE WHEREAS CHINAT FORCES WERE BEING ALLOWED TO DECLINE. AT THE SAME TIME HE OBSERVED THE 7TH FLEET'S AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY IS VAST AND SUGGESTED BY IMPLICATION THE INABILITY OF THAT FLEET TO COME TO THE DEFENSE OF TAIWAN WHEN ITS OWN CONCERNS WERE ELSEWHERE. MINISTER CHIANG THEN OUTLINED THE CHIEF PROBLEM AREAS OF DEFENSE OF TAIWAN, KEYING THESE PROBLEMS INTO OVERALL US DEFENSIVE POSTURE (BEING REPORTED SEPARATELY). HAVING DISCUSSED

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DEFENSE PROBLEMS HE SOLICITED GEN WHEELER'S SUPPORT IN THEIR SOLUTION AND OUTLINED SEVERAL MASSIVE REQUIREMENTS WHICH WERE IN ADDITION TO THE PRESENT MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM.

6. FINALLY, MINISTER CHIANG TURNED TO GRC CONTINGENCY PLANNING AND POINTED TO THE REMARKS OF THE CHICOM REPRESENTATIVE AT WARSAW WHO SAID THE US MUST GET OUT OF VIETNAM AND TAIWAN. THE PRESENT WAR HE SAID IS BEING FOUGHT BY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WHILE THE CHICOMS ARE SUPPLYING ALL THE MATERIALS. HE SUGGESTED THIS SUPPLY LINE SHOULD BE CUT AS A PART OF US STRATEGY AND OFFERED A PLAN FOR ITS ACCOMPLISHMENT.

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GP-1. HUMMEL
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